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“Schräg wird Nahes seit je am besten gesehen” [The 
near at hand has always best been seen at an angle].  
-  Ernst Bloch, 1929  
 
Introduction 
 
Both  professional  and  public  attention  has  been  so 
fixated on the “Euro crisis” over the past few years 
that  a  reflection  on  its  development  as  a  serious 
threat  to  the  currency,  or  even  to  the  EU  itself,  is 
timely.  However,  although  one  cannot  of  course 
discount the severity of the potential scenarios, these 
are not yet at the level of Joseph Conrad’s “choice of 
nightmares” and some might even be ascribed to the 
birth-pains of the Union. It is still early days yet for the 
Union – in its current configuration, which marks an 
entelechy  of  sorts,  it  is  not  even  a  decade  old.  Its 
neighbour,  Russia,  in  its  present  “post-imperial” 
borders  is  scarcely  two  decades  old  (Radzikhovsky 
2011).  There  are  still  many  levels  at  which 
harmonisation must operate and doing so takes time, 
forbearance and patience. The European Central Bank 
has not been able to take an undeniably positive role, 
yet a longer-term view would note that the First Bank 
of  the  United  States  faced  fierce  opposition  and 
scepticism. With Hamilton’s sinking fund, the essence 
of all providential and prudent debt repayment, debt 
levels dropped for several decades (only to resurface 
at the Civil War). Since there has of late been a more 
pronounced  discussion  of  such  a  possibility  for  the 
eurozone, even of a generic Stadtsparkasse or British 
“Co-op” model, parts of the European project may yet 
be saved, even if the euro needs to be reconfigured.  
 
                                                      
1 Barnard  Turner  is  Senior  Fellow  at  the  EU  Centre  in 
Singapore,  and  Associate  Professor  at  the  National 
University of Singapore (NUS), where he is also Academic 
Convenor of the European Studies Programme. The views 
expressed in this working paper are those of the author and 
do  not  necessarily  reflect  the  views  of  the  EU  Centre  in 
Singapore. 
Such a reconceptualisation would be in the spirit of 
the IMF’s Articles of Association. Under Article IV, a 
member  state  “undertakes  to  collaborate  with  the 
Fund and other members to assure orderly exchange 
arrangements  and  to  promote  a  stable  system  of 
exchange rates.” Such collaboration should of course 
be  expected  to  be  easier  for  those  member  states 
already  pursuing  effective  (if  only  partial  and  not 
always  efficacious)  currency  coordination.  It  should 
ensure  the  provision  and  continuance  of  “a 
framework  that  facilitates  the  exchange  of  goods, 
services,  and  capital  among  countries,  and  that 
sustains  sound  economic  growth,  [because]  a 
principal objective is the continuing development of 
the orderly underlying conditions that are necessary 
for  financial  and  economic  stability.”  Mid-2012,  the 
Fund  report on “Euro  Area  Policies”  pinpointed  the 
need  for  greater  integration  and  consolidation  in 
banking and sovereign funds across the eurozone. The 
report stresses not only the expected, and long absent, 
fiscal integration but its introduction in tandem with 
“ideas  of  a  political  union  and  stronger  central 
governance  with  more  risk  sharing”,  that  is  more 
Europe, a greater sense of solidarity.  
 
The  clouds  may  yet  lift  over  the  zone,  even  if  the 
stormy  seas  of  a  “Grexodus”  might  already  be 
gathering, and even if the EU institutions do not seem 
able to more than continually defer it. The maelstrom 
continues  to  circle;  the  unusually  prescient  Larry 
Elliott  opined  mid-2011  that  “We  are  less  than 
halfway  through  the  crisis  that  began  on  9  August 
2007” and “That crisis has just entered a dangerous 
new phase” (Elliott, “Global financial crisis”). As the 
crisis continues to play itself out, lashing by mid-2012 
at  the  doors  of  even  the  most  secure  eurozone 
economies and spilling over to affect growth in other 
parts  of  the  world,  the  threat  seems  to  be 
intensifying.  By  mid-2012,  with  the  International 
Monetary  Fund’s  report  (12/181)  on  “Euro  Area 
Policies,” it was becoming clear that “the euro area 
crisis [had] reached a new and critical stage.”  
 
For an attempt to chart these developments, the first 
half of 2011 (with the Arab Spring, the Libyan conflict 
and Fukushima) forms a useful watershed period. In 
August 2011, Larry Elliott detected the culmination of 
one phase of this still developing crisis: the process of 
“morphing  of  a  private  debt  crisis  into  a  sovereign 
debt crisis” which was completed when on 5 August 
2011,  S&P  downgraded  the  US’s  debt  from  AAA 
(Elliott, “Global financial crisis”).  The first months of 
2011 show “the end of the beginning”, the fruition of EUC Working Paper No. 8 
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old scenarios and the blossoming of others which, a 
year  or  so  later,  have  themselves  produced  an 
impatience  with  the  old  pieties  (contagion, 
containment)  and  a  sense  that  even  if  the 
perpetrators may have emanated from over-zealous 
Europe  the  solutions  are  stymied  because—again, 
citing Elliott — “the current crisis is the result of the 
imbalances  in  the  global  economy,  which  in  turn 
reflect  differences  in  productivity  and 
competitiveness”  (Elliott,  “Greece  election”  17  June 
2012). Here of course, his view is reminiscent of those 
of  Kishore  Mahbubani,  Luc  van  Langenhove  and 
others – if such drive is absent in Europe, it is plentiful 
in certain places in Asia. The playing out of the whole 
euro-drama over the last 2-3 years and its perception 
in Asia, and in particular in Russia form the subject of 
this paper.  
 
 
Perceptions 
  
In all of this increasingly fractious debate, perceptions 
—  based  on  image,  branding  and  historical  ties  — 
matter.  The  first  half  of  2011  is  also  of  research 
interest because comprehensive newspaper data are 
available  from  the  “Perceptions  of  the  EU  in  Asia” 
project organised by the National Centre for Research 
on  Europe  (NCRE)  in  New  Zealand  and  coordinated 
through  the  Asia-Europe  Foundation  (ASEF). 
2 These 
data  sets  were  helpfully  supplemented   by  public 
opinion surveys carried out in early 2012 as part of 
the  same  project,  and  which  can  be  seen  as 
complementary  to  the  corresponding  period  the 
previous  year  given  that  such  opinions  are  of 
generally  a  more  lasting  nature  than  transient 
newspaper commentary but to a certain extent (not in 
itself  to  be  exaggerated)  are  modified  and  in  rare 
cases even shaped by them. The data set produced by 
this ongoing project, here used as background for my 
comments,  yields  insightful  results,  and  it  is  to 
complement the project’s overarching findings that I 
aim  here,  focusing  on  the  Russian  data.  With  its 
imbrications  within  European  economic  and  energy 
systems  and  yet  with  its  own,  somewhat  detached 
agenda clearly in mind, Russia allows insights into the 
unfolding European situation from an oblique angle, 
                                                      
2 I am grateful to the NCRE and especially to Olga Gulyaeva, 
researcher on the Russian data, for making her data set 
available to me; this was helpful in mapping out the early 
stages of this paper. I am also grateful to Loke Hoe Yeong, 
researcher on the Project and at the EU Centre in 
Singapore, for his insights.  
geographically  and  (since  data  from  2011  are  here 
mainly used) temporally. Since Russia has now joined 
the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) and the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), its relatively under- researched 
viewpoint—and the abiding pertinence to this of the 
country’s “pivotal” status as argued by Sir Halford J. 
Mackinder in a 1904 lecture both revised and reviled 
over the years — on the unfolding financial crisis are 
instructive in assessing the country’s global role and 
stature  in  the  21
st  century  (Mackinder,  “The 
Geographical Pivot of History”).  
The  NCRE  survey  shows  that  a  global  mindset  is 
beginning  to  establish  itself  in  two  of  the  world’s 
largest countries, Russia and China, with a remarkable 
symmetry  between  the  perceptions  of  Russia/China 
and the EU, and to a limited extent the US. In China, 
3% thought Russia unimportant and 89% important; 
3% thought the US unimportant and 88% important; 
and  4%  thought  the  EU  unimportant  and  89% 
important. While patterns of global trade might let us 
infer that all markets are important to the Chinese, 
lower  figures  were  recorded  for  Japan  (56%)  and 
France  (64%;  in  comparison,  67%  thought  the  UK 
important and 76% Germany).  In Russia, 9% thought 
Europe/the EU unimportant and 88% important; 9% 
thought China unimportant and 86% important (only 
75%  thought  the  US  important).  Whether  such 
“importance”  should  be  gauged  politically  or 
economically,  or  a  mixture  of  both,  is  left  rather 
open.
3 While  China  is  now  Russia’s  largest  trading 
partner,  Germany  is  still  a  very  close  second,  and 
Russia’s  trade  with  just  that  country  and  the 
Netherlands  combined  would  far  outstrip  (by  some 
50%  more)  the  envisaged  growth  of  Russia-China 
trade. Not surprisingly, then, Russians view Germany 
as  more  important  than  do  respondents  in  any 
country from Asia included in the survey (88%). While 
generally  across  the  Asian  countries  selected, 
Europe/the EU is seen as some 19% more important 
over the next ten years than Germany (by 82% and 
63%), this distinction is minimal in the assessment of 
Russian respondents (88% and 84%). Because of its 
proximity and acceptance of Russian energy exports, 
the EU would be expected to be more important to 
Russia  than  to  many  other  Asian  states  (which  can 
modify their trading profiles to Asia itself more readily 
                                                      
3 With a similar openness, Bersick et al note that Europeans 
rank “the future importance” of China at 7.4 and Russia at 
6.9 (Indonesia is ranked at 5.3 and the USA 7.8 [Bersick, 
Bruter 275]). EUC Working Paper No. 8 
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than  can  Russia),  but  the  value  for  the  EU  has  not 
risen  that  much;  the  value  for  Germany,  however, 
rises from 63% to 84%. Conversely, even if declining 
to  the  bottom  of  the  super  league,  and  only  of 
average  importance  to  Russia  (59%),  Britain  is  still 
considered  to  be  more  important  to  many  of  the 
surveyed countries than Germany (70% thinking the 
Atlantic  nation  important  in  the  next  ten  years  as 
opposed to 65% for Europe’s largest economy). Trade, 
then,  is  not  the  only  consideration  and  Russian 
exceptionalism among the surveyed Asian countries, 
albeit expected, is noteworthy. 
 
Scatter characterises many of the NCRE public opinion 
findings,  especially  when  certain  rather  specialist 
questions about the EU as an “actor” across various 
domains are asked, and the findings can be therefore 
rather tenuous.
4 For example, high  information costs 
and low engagement or interest levels  would make 
any informed opinion from average Asians difficult to 
assess in topics such as the significance of the EU’s 
dealings  with  the  Middle East  or  the  USA.  There  is 
perhaps a certain politicized hubris perhaps in even 
asking  such  questions,  and  nothing  really  surprising 
that,  beyond  the  inference  that  the  respondent 
gathered that there was supposed to be something 
significant  about  the  question  and  therefore  a 
response in the low end was perhaps not “right” or 
that  since  the  USA,  China  or  carbon  emissions 
reduction,  which  appeared  in  the  question,  is 
indubitably  important,  something  about  the  EU’s 
relation  it  them  must  by  implication  also  be 
important,  little  can  be  judged  from  the  findings 
which would prevail against standard margin of error 
perimeters.  That  so  few  (on  average,  some  0.12%) 
answered  “don’t  know”  to  such  questions  implies 
perhaps  merely  that  they  were  happy  to  hazard  a 
guess,  knowing  clearly  what  was  required  of  the 
question and the search terms within it.  
 
In  assessing  these  survey  results,  it  is  important  to 
distinguish  trends  and  reactions.  Impressions  of 
Europe as a category preform those of the European 
Union, and the two categories cannot be meaningfully 
conceptualised  and  bundled  together.  While  some 
                                                      
4 For example, the comment by Bersick et al that Europeans 
see North America as a currently more “important” region 
than Asia does not seem to be substantiated, given 
standard margin of error parameters, by the data which 
show that the former was given a 7.3 (out of 10) rating and 
the latter 7; the notion of “importance” should also here be 
nuanced more (Bersick, Bruter et al. 276). 
two thirds across the ten countries
5 claim that they 
regularly access media for foreign news, and 52% can 
be  inferred  to  read  foreign  news  in  newspapers 
regularly (more than once a week), only 56% had 
heard of the European Commission, and 59% of the 
European Parliament. The interest in foreign news, for 
more than half the population, does not extend to the 
institutions of the EU; this should of course come as 
no surprise, as one might expect something similar for 
a survey of Europeans which asked about ECOWAS, 
MERCOSUR or ASEAN. The argument that the EU is 
the  world’s  largest  trading  bloc/single  market  is 
insufficient  for  people  to  take  an  active,  personal 
interest in it, and European expectations that interest 
should be higher is perhaps mere hubris.  
   
The perceptions sometimes rather give insights into, 
or reinforce external stereotypes about, the surveyed 
countries and therefore conform to the standard view 
of the shock of alterity: confrontation with the other 
forces a moral choice (along the lines of rejection or 
acceptance and integration as seen in the works of 
Emmanuel  Levinas)  or  at  least  the  “performative” 
obligation to assess one’s own social and individual 
parameters (Peeren and Horstkotte 10). 73% of Thais, 
70% of Russians and 69% of Malaysians saw the EU as 
modern,  but  only  42%  of  Japanese,  39%  of  New 
Zealanders and 35% of Australians. 63% of Indians and 
12%  of  Japanese  saw  the  EU  as  “efficient”  (the 
average was a low 34%). Yet on occasion the results 
seem a little off from these stereotypes: those two 
countries  (Australia  and  New  Zealand)  with  long-
standing patterns of European immigration are both 
at  the  low  end  of  the  range  (24%  and  23% 
respectively) of those countries which see the EU as 
“likeable” (meaning, I suppose, that the respondent 
detected  some  affinity  with  the  population  [i.e. 
Europeans]  rather  than  with  the  institutions  [the 
European Union as such]). Only China (16%) thought 
the EU less likeable, the average being 35%; Russia 
(46%) follows South Korea (49%) and India (55%) in 
apparently most liking the EU.  
 
While  the  NCRE  survey  highlights  the  role  of  the 
media in shaping public opinion, a person’s views of 
an  Other,  especially  one  as  distant,  distinct  and 
diverse as Asia (or, to a slightly less extent, Europe), 
are  prefigured  in  random  spasmodic  but  enduring 
ways  through  education,  personal  contacts,  family 
connections, etc. While EuropeAsia migration is not 
                                                      
5 Australia, China, India, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, New 
Zealand, Russia, Singapore and Thailand EUC Working Paper No. 8 
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yet  so  developed,  Asia  (especially  West  and  South 
Asia)Europe  migration  is  a  long-standing  trend, 
with some 8% for example of the UK population born 
outside Europe. Thus while the EU in the eyes of Asia 
survey  shows  only  a  low  personal  connection  with 
Europe, even for the two “settler colonies” Australia 
and New Zealand, as for example only some 7.6% had 
travelled  there,  conversely  personal  ties  of  recent 
immigrants to Europe would give more substance to 
fleeting impressions of at least one part of the vast 
Asian continent for a significantly greater proportion 
of  the  population.  Interculturalism  thus  cuts  both 
ways,  and  the  polarisation  (Asia/Europe)  in  the 
survey,  admittedly  a  consequence  of  the 
intercontinental  dialogic  process  of  ASEM  itself,  is 
helpfully nuanced by the Russian data which, as the 
country itself, cut both ways, allowing reflection on 
both  AsiaEurope  and  EuropeAsia  perceptions. 
Given  that  interculturalism  is  a  rising  norm  rather 
sidelined  in  intergovernmentalist,  political  “elite” 
driven international relations, such a dimension can 
also  usefully  be  uncovered  in  assessing  the  Russian 
data.  
 
 
Newspapers: the Rossiiskaya Gazeta  
 
The NCRE project gives an overview of several main 
news outlets in Russia; my present purpose is to focus 
on  just  one,  Russia’s  governmental  newspaper  of 
record, the Rossiiskaya Gazeta. Even if the Gazeta has 
only  moderate  circulation,  its  stature,  its 
representation of a judicious selection of opinion and 
policy makers in the capital and beyond (making in 
large part a separate “elite interview” section of data 
gathering,  as  in  the  NCRE  project,  somewhat 
gratuitous) and its balanced, conservative views give it 
the  hallmarks  of  authority  in  delineating  educated 
opinion. Howard Davis and Anna Sosnovkaya (2009) 
claim  that  the  Gazeta  “is  an  ideal  model  of 
interpretation of events from the point of view of the 
federal government.” The Perceptions survey shows 
that the Gazeta has the greatest number of reports by 
its own and local correspondents, and makes minimal 
use  of  international  wires;  not  surprisingly,  in 
contrast, the Finnish-owned, English language “expat” 
Moscow Times avails itself of western wires, mostly 
notably Thomson Reuters. While Interfax, founded in 
1989, is the most cited Russian news agency (Interfax 
2012), the Gazeta uses more the longer-established, 
traditional  ITAR-TASS  sources.  As  the  NCRE  project 
found and at least judging by the foreign coverage in 
the Gazeta, while some 58% of EU-related news in the 
Gazeta (typical for the Russian print media tracked) 
takes the EU as a main focus, and this is far greater 
than that in comparable East Asian print news (which 
averages  something  like  28%  [Bersick  and  Holland 
2012]), the attention to the EU has to compete with 
much other foreign news in the Gazeta, especially of 
course from the USA on the one hand and Asia on the 
other.  Much  news  that  emanates  from  Europe,  of 
course, has little to do with the EU as such, a point 
rather  elided  in  some  of  the  NCRE  public  opinion 
findings.
6 While  then  an  article  may  have  “more 
Europe”  in  it,  the  particular  newspaper  issue  itself 
contextualises  this  attention  from  a  global 
perspective.  Russia’s  self-conception  (and  abiding 
actuality) as a global player give this “official” organ a 
broad  scope  across  the  continents  and  a  marked 
proportion of the EU news (that is, the news which 
focuses on EU countries) does not concern the Union, 
its  crisis,  or  its  main  institution.  Much  of  the  news 
therefore could be classified as of social or general 
interest  rather  than  as  “political”  as  such,  with  the 
obvious proviso that the largest proportion of news 
emanating from Europe in the period studied is about 
the  financial  crisis  (but  not  exclusively  so,  as  is 
demonstrated  in  the  following  paragraphs).  This 
would  fit  the  profile  revealed  by  the  NCRE  Public 
Opinion survey that habitual readers of foreign news 
are more likely to be older (100% of those over 65 fall 
into this category) and retired. 
 
The Gazeta’s view of the euro crisis from early 2011 
 
Despondency has so clouded European horizons, even 
yielding to resignation and indifference among those 
less affected (at least as yet), has begun so to unsettle 
other parts of the world, and faith in summitry has 
been so eroded that it is somehow refreshing to read 
the  concerns,  almost  as  if  those  of  an  earlier 
generation,  of  the  Gazeta  in  early  2011.  The 
newspaper  shows  itself  consistently  patient,  broad 
and above all restrained in its approach to the crisis, 
delivering  its  news  in  a  dry,  acerbic,  almost 
metaphorless  style  expected  of  a  governmental 
newspaper of record and which makes an approach 
through discourse analysis unrewarding (for example 
Musolff  2004  and  Zbierska-Sawala  2004).  Examples 
                                                      
6 Readers even with no Russian can test these claims by 
accessing the daily online world news section of the Gazeta 
(http://www.rg.ru/mir/) and clicking on the various parts of 
the world map to come to lists of the most recent reports. 
A photo by each item is generally enough to get an idea of 
the article’s topic.  EUC Working Paper No. 8 
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such as the world’s currencies being “hostages to the 
dollar”  (25  January),  Greece  “holding  the  euro  to 
ransom”(2 August), or the metaphorical value of place 
deixis  (“north…south”)  in  every  country  and  region 
highlighted by Ruslan Greenberg director, Institute of 
Economics  of  the  Russian  Academy  of  Sciences  to 
underscore a point that regional imbalances are not 
confined to the eurozone (Zykova “Греция”, 2 August 
2011), become noteworthy because they are so rare. 
While in turn EU leaders showed melancholic or even 
choleric dispositions, well-placed commentators and 
officials  in  the  Gazeta  were  more  phlegmatic,  even 
sanguine, at times even apparently sympathetic to the 
plight of the EU’s administration and seeing the crisis 
as much as of managerial connections as financial or 
macroeconomic in the widest sense.  
 
Throughout early 2011, the newspaper maintained a 
position that the crisis was serious but manageable. 
While, during the first trimester of 2011, the crisis was 
relatively  quiet,  the  Gazeta  gave  prominence  to  a 
range  of  stories  concerning  the  EU  member  states, 
from a pharmaceutical scandal in France (20 January 
2011),  an  overview  of  street  stall  licensing  in 
comparison to new legislation in Moscow (20 January), 
to  the  new  Russian  ambassador’s  visit,  in  a  state 
coach,  to  Buckingham  Palace  to  present  his 
credentials (April 2011). A burgeoning financial crisis 
of  game-changing  proportions  did  not  seem  highly 
likely,  although  many  commentators  expressed 
concerns. Yet Larry Elliott posted a comment about 
the Davos Economic Forum in which he saw signs that 
the  world  economy  was  “settling”  and  that  any 
warning  signs  were  mostly  about  the  US  budget 
deficit; he did not mention Europe once (“Will Davos 
heed”, 26 January 2011). Alexey V. Ulyukaev, Deputy 
Chairman  of  the  Bank  of  Russia,  the  Federation’s 
Central Bank (and a graduate of the Université Pierre-
Mendès-France,  Grenoble)  expressed  in  an  article 
published in mid-January his view that the euro was 
still  relatively  strong,  that  oscillations  were  to  be 
expected and that the currency might even emerge 
from the crisis stronger than ever (Zykova, “Рубль”, 
12  January  2012).  On  the  27  January,  under  the 
headline  “An  optimistic  recession,”  the  Gazeta 
reported  on  a  Pricewaterhouse  Cooper’s  survey  of 
world business leaders published for the Davos Forum 
which  saw  Russian  executives  more  optimistic  than 
their counterparts elsewhere in the world. While the 
Russians seemed more concerned about increases in 
corporate  taxation,  world  business  executives  were 
more  troubled  by  deflationary,  austerity  measures 
which would curb investment and economic growth 
(and  hence  the  ability  to  sell  products  either 
domestically  or  internationally)  (Kykol, 
“Оптимистическая  рецессия”, 27  January  2011).  In 
an  article  published  the  previous  day,  Kykol 
mentioned European debt problems only in passing, 
to  focus  more  on  the  longer-term  drone  of  the 
seemingly intractable US debt (“Заложники доллара”, 
26 January 2011). 
 
Even  in  June  2011,  in  the  face  of  a  tense  and 
worsening situation on the streets of Athens and with 
a series of general strikes to be expected, the Gazeta 
tempered its rather critical tone towards the trades 
unions  with  an  assessment  of  the  impact  of  such 
unrest  on  the  tourist  season  (a  theme  of  articles 
about Greece on the 16
th, 27
th and 29
th). On 29 June, 
the  Gazeta  both  reported  on  the  48-hour  strike  in 
Greece  and  gave  a  lengthy,  chatty  interview  with 
Hillary  Clinton  on  the  occasion  of  a  meeting  with 
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. On 2 August, 
the  Gazeta  published  quoted  Ruslan  Greenberg  as 
saying that the euro is still the world’s second reserve 
currency; it and the dollar would be there “in earnest 
and for the long-term” (Zykova “Греция”).  
  
Even on 9 December 2011, when Nikita Maslennikov 
of  the  Higher  School  of  Economics  (HSE)  in  Saint 
Petersburg  reminded  a  Moscow  forum  that  45%  of 
Russian currency reserves are in euros, and when the 
forum discussions were published under the alarmist 
heading “Is there life after the euro?”, participants’ 
conclusions were more speculative than doom-laden. 
Maslennikov  was  quoted  as  describing  talk  of  the 
euro’s  collapse  as  “non-scientific  fantasy”.  In  using 
such  a  term,  he  was  joined  by  company  director 
Avgan  Mikaelyan  who  also  called  such  a  collapse 
“fantastic” (that is, highly improbable), and Moscow 
HSE economist Varely Mironov who called a break-up 
in the near term “hardly likely” because of measures 
announced  and  foreseen  by  the  European  Central 
Bank  and  other  sources.  There  would  of  course 
however  be  some,  but  limited  and  manageable 
repercussions if the scenario did play itself out. The oil 
price might fall, and the fall in demand would affect 
other  sectors  of  the  Russian  economy,  for  example 
white goods exports to the EU, leading to layoffs with 
not even the certainty that the ruble would fall less 
drastically than the euro and hence Russians would 
find  European  holidays  cheaper  (Panin,  “Есть  ли 
жизнь”). Here, since so few Russians seem to have 
been able to travel to Europe, the participants were 
showing their own middle-class status. According to 
both  the  NCRE  opinion  poll  and  a  2007 EUC Working Paper No. 8 
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Всероссийский  центр  изучения  общественного 
мнения  (ВЦИОМ)  (All-Russian  Public  Opinion 
Research  Centre)  poll,  only  some  8%  of  Russians 
(about as many as Indians) had ever been to Europe 
even  if  19%  expressed  a  desire  to  visit  France  (All-
Russian  Public  Opinion  Research  Centre,  “Life 
Abroad”). Little had therefore occurred to affect the 
Gazeta’s  view  of  early  February  2011  that  Russia 
would find a niche for itself in the “post-crisis” global 
economy,  even  if  exactly  “how  precisely  all  the 
problems  will  be  solved”  (как  именно  будут 
решаться все проблемы) remains “unknown” (Kykol, 
“Новый взгляд”, 15 February 2011).  
 
The euro crisis then would affect Russia, but indirectly 
as any longer-term recession would dampen energy 
demand and thus affect Russia’s growth. In the latter 
half of June 2011, when much hinged on the public 
and political acceptance of the Greek “mid-term plan” 
of increased austerity upon which the second rescue 
package depended, the Gazeta published daily stories 
about Greece, on three days two such articles, and 
even on two days (the 16
th and 17
th) three. However, 
while the IMF and the ratings agencies are frequently 
seen as actors, and the individual countries affected 
(most  notably  of  course  Greece,  but  to  a  certain 
extent Portugal) are often highlighted, the European 
Union itself and its institutions (with the exception of 
course of the European Central Bank) rarely appear as 
agents in those articles which (using the Gazeta’s own 
search  engine)  can  be  loosely  grouped  under  the 
heading (сюжет) “Debt crisis of the European Union” 
(долговой кризис Евросоюза [EC]). Given then that 
some 100 articles over the first six months of 2011 
can  loosely  be  so  tagged,
7 the  prominence  of  EU 
institutional  actors  is  relatively  low.  While  Жозе 
Мануэль  Баррозу  (Jose  Manuel  Barroso)  yields  a 
respectable  58  articles,  a  search  for  Херман  Ван 
Ромпей (Herman van Rompuy) yields roughly half this 
number (31 items, although again some of these are 
overlaps), one of which repeats from Newsweek some 
rather  jocular  speculation  that  Arnold 
Schwarzenegger might be back in Europe to take over 
his post (Makarychev, “Терминатор”, 22 April 2011). 
                                                      
7The list can be generated from 
http://www.rg.ru/sujet/4045/index.html and includes 
rubrics/search terms including “Greece,” and the other 
main countries, “money” and “macroeconmics”; as a point 
of comparison, the NCRE survey found some 155 articles in 
the Gazeta with some reference to the EU. Even at this 
turning point of the crisis, then, a third of EU-related 
articles were not about it. 
Кэтрин Эштон (Catherine Ashton) gets some 70 hits, 
mostly  about  the  situation  in  Libya  and  the  “Arab 
Spring”  countries;  yet  Хиллари  Клинтон  (Hillary 
Clinton) produces 119. Generally, when a contrastive, 
“Western” view is sought on matters closer to home 
(Belarus,  Ukraine),  Clinton  rather  than  Ashton  is 
quoted. Surprisingly perhaps, Жан-Клод Трише (Jean-
Claude  Trichet,  of  the  European  Central  Bank) 
discloses  only  some  dozen  items.  In  comparison,  a 
search for likely references to the following national 
leaders  garnered  a  range  of  results:  Барак  Обама 
(Barack  Obama)  455  articles  across  the  six  month 
period  (Jan-June  2011);  Николя  Саркози  (Nicolas 
Sarkozy) 193; Ангела Меркель (Angela Merkel) 117, 
only  a  few  more  than  Дэвид  Кэмерон  (David 
Cameron)  108;  премьер  Греции  Г.  Папандреу 
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(Greek  PM  George  Papandreou),  only  30;  Виктор 
Янукович (Viktor Yanukovich) 125 (Юлия Тимошенко, 
Yulia  Timoshenko  30);  Ху  Цзиньтао  (Hu  Jintao)  64; 
Манмохан  Сингх  (Manmohan  Singh)  6;  Дилма 
Руссефф  (Dilma  Rouseff)  5;  and  Стивен  Харпер 
(Stephen Harper) 5. Clearly, European leaders need to 
propose  measures  or  even  intervene  directly  (for 
example, militarily) on the international scene other 
than  respond  to  the  financial  crisis  in  order  to  get 
noticed  by  Gazeta  reporters.  One  might  also  infer 
from the list that that the Greek cabinet is not seen as 
a main actor in its own land. 
 
 
The EU seen as an assemblage of divergent and 
diverging nation states 
 
The EU is more often seen as a context or field of 
action rather than a source of action itself, except on 
those  occasions  where  a  rather  generically  defined 
“EU” prescribes actions, takes sanctions, etc., that is 
when it can be seen as a source of proscription or 
negative  action.  Thus  the  positive  moves  by  the 
Commission and the Council to resolve a burgeoning 
crisis are downplayed, for instance. Very rarely is any 
consistent, painstaking and exacting focus given to an 
elaboration  of  EU  institutional  policy-making  and 
rationale as trends rather than as reactions; without 
the  crisis,  then,  it  could  be  speculated  that  the  EU 
would not be as prominent as it has appeared to be. 
Of course, abstract, abstruse consideration of policy-
making  is  something  of  a  niche  subject  even  for 
readers of a quality daily such as the Gazeta.  
                                                      
8 In various combinations, as both the Greek and Russian 
versions of the name are used and his first given name is 
often shortened to just “Г” [“G”] EUC Working Paper No. 8 
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More  generally,  nation  states  rather  than  the  EU 
institutions are still seen as actors, as this seemingly 
gives  Russia  room  to  manoeuvre  which  might  be 
limited by moves by the EU’s paramount institution to 
take to itself a singular policy-making competence. In 
a  cautiously  optimistic  piece,  “Европа:  хорошие 
новости” (“Europe: good news”) for the Gazeta (13 
July 2012), Sergey Karaganov distinguishes, in a way 
that the NCRE survey does not, those “efficient” EU 
countries  (the  “diligent  and  effective  Germans” 
[трудолюбивые и эффективные немцы] at the fore) 
and other EU states. There is of course a problem with 
such stratification, as it overlooks historical and other 
contingencies which would nuance national (or even 
sub-national)  definitions  of  efficiency,  and  the 
differentiation  may  reinforce  certain  national 
stereotypes  rather  than  use  classifications  as 
explicatory factors. Yet the effort to see divergences 
where  the  NCRE  survey  posits  an  amalgam  is 
pertinent. More importantly, he also distinguishes an 
active, Europeanising  civil  society,  with  its  widening 
branches  through  SMEs,  NGOs  and  other  interest 
groups,  and  overly  politicized  (perhaps  crypto-
nationalist) agendas underlying and undermining any 
true  progress  in  addressing  the  euro  crisis.  This 
distinction again is limited in the categorical frames 
(the  affective  assessment  of  whether  the  EU  is 
hypocritical, arrogant, etc.) of the NCRE project.   
 
However, the  Gazeta’s general tendency to play up 
the individual EU member states and the differences 
between or camps among them must be bifurcated 
according to domain.  A differentiation is marked for 
example,  between  Germany  and  Poland  over  the 
route  of  the  “Nord  Stream”  pipeline  in  the  Baltic. 
Whereas EU policy integration over energy contracts 
with  third  parties  would potentially  put  Russia  at a 
disadvantage (for example, as argued in an article by 
Alexander  Epishov,  First  Deputy  Director-General  of 
the Moscow International Energy Forum, “Своя рука” 
6 April 2011), such EU coordination to settle the euro 
crisis is of course welcomed, especially if it supports 
the euro with a range of packages from the IMF and 
external sovereign funds. 
 
 
Energy issues as main focus and concern in 
relation to the euro crisis 
 
Perhaps the Gazeta’s main concern looking forward 
from  beginning  2011  was  the  need  for  the 
modernization and expansion of oil and gas extraction, 
given (as Nikolai Patrushev, Secretary of the Russian 
Security Council noted in an interview published on 13 
January [Egorov, “За теплом”]) that western Siberian 
reserves  were  beginning  to  be  depleted,  that  the 
extraction  rate  was  well  below  world  averages  and 
that, most of all, the greatest reserves were on the 
continental shelf (i.e. in the Arctic), the extraction of 
which is becoming of “enormous (огромное) strategic 
and  economic  significance.”  On  21  January,  the 
Gazeta published a full interview with Viktor Poselov, 
deputy  director  of  St  Petersburg’s  All-Russian 
Research Institute of Geology and Mineral Resources 
of  the  World  Ocean  (VNIIOkeangeologia),  who 
patiently  deliberated  and  itemized  the  scientific 
investigations  under  way  to  demonstrate  that  two 
potentially  energy-rich  ridges  in  the  Arctic  (the 
Mendeleev  and  Lomonosov)  actually  belong  to  the 
Russian  continental  shelf  so  that  a  case  can  be 
reformulated  to  the  relevant  UN  commission  under 
the Convention on the Law of the Sea (Feshchenko, 
“Споров”, 21
 January 2011).  
 
On the one hand, then, a high ruble (based largely on 
high oil prices, a recurrent theme of Gazeta articles 
through the period considered, with an article each 
time  the  price  reached  USD  100  a  barrel,  mostly 
because of the Egyptian, then Libyan situations [e.g. 
on 8 and 22 February]) is necessary for modernization 
and  investment  to  continue  to  produce  essential 
export flows. In actuality, oil prices stayed at around 
the 100USD a barrel level for little under half the year 
and have stayed depressed for most of 2012. On the 
other hand, a high ruble would increase Europeans’ 
support  for  increased  reduction  of  Russian  energy 
imports;  higher  prices  would  impede  European 
economic growth upon which Russian energy prices 
largely  still  depend.  Diversification  of  energy 
transmission,  “looking  East,”  with  the  provision  of 
energy  to  the  Asian  Pacific  littoral  states  and  the 
yuan-ruble  market,  should  be  an  effective 
counterbalance to any shortfalls from the European 
side. Yet Alexander Epishov, writing on 6 April 2011, 
was  cautious  in  his  estimation  of  equivalent 
advantages  “on  the  other  side”  of  the  Eurasian 
landmass (в противоположной от Европы стороне): 
China’s  future  energy  strategy  is  characterized  by 
“uncertainty” (неопределённость), “unconventional” 
(нетрадиционные  )resources  (including  of  course 
renewables) may take a larger share in the energy mix, 
and,  most  importantly,  the  Chinese  seems  like  a 
“buyer’s market” such that levels of profit similar to 
those in high GDP per capita Europe are not to be 
expected (Epishov, “Своя рука”, 6 April 2011).  EUC Working Paper No. 8 
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Epishov and Sergey Pravosydov, the general director 
of  the  National  Energy  Institute,  in  an  article 
published  on  2  September  2011  (Pravosydov, 
“Nabucco иссяк”), are scathing about the chances of 
Turkmen  gas  flowing  to  Europe  through  the  once-
cherished  Austrian  Nabucco  pipeline,  favouring 
naturally  instead  the  Gazprom  joint  venture  South 
Stream.  Questions  along  the  western  Asian 
transmission  route  for  Nabucco,  and  of  supply  and 
price stability, all argue in favour of the South Stream 
project, and Russia can be more sanguine given the 
German decision to phase out nuclear power, which 
has thrust the door wide open to coal from the US 
and if anything to an increase in energy from Russia 
(for  a  still  largely  current  overview,  see  Dusseault 
[2010]). Yet of course Greece gradually began in 2011 
to cloud the horizon. In November, when oil slipped 
to just over USD 89 a barrel (down 4% on the day), the 
Gazeta found the cause in the “situation in Greece,” 
since the Greek PM had called for a referendum on 
the  expected  measures  imposed  on  his  country  (a 
referendum which was not held) (“Нефть [Neft’],” 1 
November 2011).   
 
Russia is of course resource rich from agriculture to 
energy but dependent on higher prices, i.e. a palpable 
need for these commodities in its client markets to 
keep modernization projects on track at a time when 
falling  populations,  lower  energy  intensity  and 
competition from across the Atlantic reduce demand 
in its traditional strongest market, the EU. Even today 
almost  half  of  Russia’s  trade  is  with  the  Union, 
although  if  such  modernization  of  Russian  energy 
infrastructure proceeds apace Asia will become more 
important. Russian gas is of course expected to flow 
eastwards  and  Russian  coal  is  increasingly  exported 
south  and  east,  but  Mongolian  coal  may  be  less 
expensive for China in the short term and closer of 
course to their markets (“Asians, Russians”). At a time 
when even vociferous ecologically minded nations like 
the Germans and the Dutch are importing US coal at 
near record levels, Russian energy exporters may take 
heart  from  the  2010  Hartwell  Paper’s  “radical 
reframing” of the climate change debate away from 
an  obsession  with  carbon  emissions  (trading): 
“climate change is better understood as a persistent 
condition that must be coped with and can only be 
partially managed more – or less – well” (Prins 16).  
 
 
 
 
 
The pivot turning east, but the EU still important 
 
In 1904, Sir Halford J. Mackinder , the second Director 
of the London School of Economics, gave a lecture at 
the  Royal  Geographical  Society  in  London,  “The 
Geographical Pivot of History,” in which he argued the 
“pivotal”  status  of  the  Russian  heartland  in  global 
(which  still  then  largely  was  conceived  as  Eurasian) 
history. While attention to his thesis has waxed and 
waned over the years, Russia’s ability to switch over 
to supply energy to China when that country’s needs 
are rising as Europe’s demand declines gives back to 
Russia  this  “pivotal”  position.  As  noted  above,  the 
NCRE public opinion poll found that Russians generally 
see Europe and China as about of equal importance 
economically  (63%  thought  Europe  very  important; 
59% China). Yet a June 2012  Всероссийский центр 
изучения общественного мнения (ВЦИОМ) (The All-
Russian Public Opinion Research Center) open poll of 
residents in Siberia and the Russian Far East gives a 
different  picture,  with,  not  surprisingly,  59%  saying 
that China was of greatest importance to the region(s) 
while  Europe  (16%)  and  the  eastern  part  of  Russia 
(11%)  lagged  far  behind  (All-Russian  Public  Opinion 
Research Centre, “Siberia”).   
 
Yet the fulcrum position is as yet underdeveloped to 
Russia’s east, and if eurozone problems begin to spill 
over  onto  the  Russian  economy,  such  development 
might be indefinitely deferred. Given then the view 
that  both  the  euro  and  the  dollar  are  still 
indispensable anchors of world trade, at least in the 
near  term,  Russia  might  judiciously  and  prudently 
accept  offers  of  investment  in  the  EU  where  these 
seem  manageable  and  profitable.  When  on  19 
January  (Zhebit,  “Евроспас”),  the  Gazeta  quoted 
Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin as saying that Russia 
might be interested in eurozone bonds (but not then 
those of Spain), the article’s title was reminiscent of 
one a week or so earlier (Zykova, “Евро”, 13 January) 
which said that Japan and China had been considering 
similar actions, the latter even of buying Spanish debt. 
Like Russia, China seemed in favour of some form of 
“Eurobonds” (Lisbonne-de Vergeron 30). In a sign of 
an  evolving  situation  and  of  relative  criteria  of 
profitability  and  growth,  on  29  June,  Arkady 
Dvorkovich,  Assistant  to  the  Russian  President  (and 
subsequently Deputy Prime Minister) mentioned that 
Russia could buy Spanish debt, but not that of Greece 
(“Аркадий  Дворкович  [Arkady  Dvorkovich]”).  Most 
recently,  when  in  July  2012  Vladimir  Putin  met 
Spanish King Juan Carlos I in Moscow on confer on 
him  the  State  Prize  of  the  Russian  Federation,  the EUC Working Paper No. 8 
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Gazeta’s  headline  (a  quotation  from  the  Spanish 
monarch) was that the two countries were “partners 
of  the  first  order”  (“socios  de  primera  clase”).  The 
Russian  President  expressed  his  conviction  that  the 
Spanish  king’s  visit  would  serve  to  open  up  “yet 
untapped possibilities” (Petrov, “Партнеры”, 20 July 
2012).   
 
 
Oppositions and alliances between dominant 
and emerging currencies: the US dollar, the euro, 
the ruble and the yuan 
 
As Sergey Karaganov reminded his readers in his 13 
July  2012  op-ed  piece  for  the  Gazeta  mentioned 
above,  “Европа: хорошие  новости”  [“Europe:  good 
news”], we are all “in the same boat”.  This “we” has 
begun to include not only the EU’s neighbours but the 
world  in  general.  As  commentators  in  the  Gazeta 
noted  in  2011,  the  world  needs  a  strong  (but  not 
overwhelming or in Karaganov’s words “triumphalist”) 
euro as a counter-weight to the US dollar, or at least 
until  such  time  as  other  currencies  can  add  to  the 
basket of reserve currencies, the place of the pound 
and yen in which is gradually being eroded. Here the 
position of the Gazeta in early 2011 is instructive and 
in some ways prophetic (although the newspaper was 
not  the  only  place  where  such  views  were  being 
expressed). On the one hand (in the two articles by 
Zykova, “Рубль”, 12 January and “Евро”, 13 January), 
the euro is threatened (although, as mentioned above, 
the situation is not critical), and thus casts a cloud on 
a favourable picture for Russia (for example that oil 
prices will stay at around USD 100) since even if the 
country  would  like  to  diversify  its  export  portfolio 
(and the Duma’s ratification of WTO accession in mid-
2012 might help this) some 70% of Russia’s exports 
are still in the energy sector. On the other hand, the 
“monopoly”  or “hegemony”  (Chichkin,  “Валютный”, 
13 January 2011) was detrimental, as “global finances 
should  not  depend  on  the  Federal  reserve.”  On  18 
January 2011, an article quotes Chinese President Hu 
Jintao as calling the global currency system based on 
the dollar a “relic of the past” (Chichkin, “Юань”). An 
article published on the eve of the 2011 Davos Forum 
(25  January)  under  the  heading  “Hostages  to  the 
dollar” (the term is from Ruslan Greenberg), reminds 
readers of the enormous size of the US debt and the 
Chinese dollar holdings, and quotes Chen Fengying of 
the Institute of World Economic Studies in Beijing as 
stating  that  a  full-scale  US  recession  and  attendant 
drastic dollar devaluation would led to the “loss of all 
that  [the  Chinese]  had  amassed  with  such  effort” 
(Kykol, “Заложники”, 25 January 2011).   
 
If however the yuan is to strengthen—as it had been 
doing  “if  not  as  quickly  as  the  US  would  like” 
(Chichkin, “Валютный”, 13 January 2011)—this would 
be not only through a growing per capita GDP but also 
by  its  global  presence,  to  which  end  a  ruble-yuan 
alliance should be strengthened, and the opening of 
direct  ruble-yuan  trade  at  the  end  of  2010  was  a 
positive first step. As an article a week later implied 
(with the focalisation a little more from the Chinese 
side perhaps), US-Chinese relations could be strained, 
but  the  two  countries  were  “sworn  to  friendship” 
(Заклятая дружба, a reversal of the Russian term for 
“sworn  enemies”)  through  business  deals.  On  the 
occasion  of  President  Hu’s  visit  to  Washington, 
President  Obama  did  not  miss  the  opportunity  to 
repeat a call for the Chinese to help ease the yuan’s 
appreciation. The article ends with a point, taken from 
an  NBC  poll,  that  38%  of  Americans  thought  that 
China would be world leader in 20 years, yet only 35% 
considered  the  US  to  be  capable  of  sustaining  its 
position (Gasyuk, “В переводе”, 21 January 2011).   
 
Pragmatic  alliances,  of  varying  duration,  are  thus 
considered  best  in  a  changeable,  even  volatile 
situation.  It  is  not  surprising  therefore  that 
throughout the  half year the  Gazeta  returns  to  the 
importance of forging partnerships, particularly with 
those with long-term common interests, for example, 
the  customs  union  between  Russia,  Belarus  and 
Kazakhstan  (2011/05/05  and  2011/05/19)  and  the 
intention  to  outline  an  agreement  on  a  Eurasian 
economic community (the new EEC if you will) by the 
beginning  of  2013  (“Владимир  Путин  [Vladimir 
Putin]”,  19  May  2011).  In  the  opinion  of  Ruslan 
Greenberg, as quoted in an article dated 2 February 
2011,  the  Community  would  act  to  lessen  any 
inflationary  impact  of  a  weakening  ruble  as  a 
consequence  of  eurozone  problems  (Zykova, 
“Греция”).  Of  equal  importance  has  been  a 
strengthening  of  the  Russo-German  relation, 
especially through commercial ties. On 5 May 2011, 
Анна  Розэ  (Anna  Rose),  Berlin  correspondent, 
reported  on  90  years  of  Russo-German  business 
relations and highlighted the view of Eckhard Cordes, 
the  Chair  of  the  Ost-Auschuss  (the  Eastern 
Committtee  of  German  industry)  that  only  by 
“combining their efforts” could Germany and Russia 
hold  out  against  the  world’s  leading  economic 
powers, China and the USA (Rose, “Дружба”). Cordes 
stressed such an opinion almost a year later in an op-EUC Working Paper No. 8 
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ed piece for Die Welt (Cordes, “Zeit”, 8 May 2012) a 
few months before the Duma ratified their country’s 
entry into the WTO and the Year of Germany in Russia 
started  (2012-2013)  under  the  ambitious  motto 
“Building  the  future  together“  („вместе  строим 
будущее”; “gemeinsam die Zukunft gestalten”). 
  
 
Russia still as pivot, even more so in 2012 than 
1904: Asia, the EU and the US 
 
Yet  here,  geography  is  destiny.  Mackinder’s 
“heartland”  or  “pivot”  thesis  may  seem  outdated 
since  air  has  taken  the  place  of  rail  in  global 
communications.  Yet  the  geographical  location  of 
Russia  has  not  of  course  changed,  whatever  its 
political composition since 1918, 1945 and then 1989. 
Arguably  (as  we  await  the  outcome  of  future  UN 
deliberation about “ownership” of the Arctic), Russia 
has  contiguous  or  near-contiguous  borders  with 
several  of  the  world’s  larger  countries,  leading 
populations  and  economies:  China,  the  US  and 
Canada, and the EU. Indeed, with national armaments 
of the EU member states considered as part of some 
future  EU  arsenal,  Russia  sees  a  considerable 
proportion  of  its  borders  surrounded  by  nuclear 
powers, more so than perhaps any other country. The 
new nuclear potentialities of several states, and the 
continuing nuclear armaments of others (certain ex-
Soviet states like Kazakhstan notwithstanding), make 
the  21
st  century  a  particularly  risky  time  for  the 
country, and agreements to end old animosities are 
necessary to free agendas for handling potential new 
ones.  Russian moves into the Arctic serve to remind 
that the world is “round” (to pick up an image from 
Mackinder’s  1943  essay, “The  round  world  and  the 
winning of the peace”), but this both north-south and 
east-west.  Hence  the  successful  ratification  of  the 
START-3 treaty in January and entry into force when 
signed by Hillary Clinton and Sergei Lavrov in February 
was cause for some celebration.  
 
The other important topic for the Gazeta during the 
time  of  the  ripening  of  the  euro  crisis  is  then  the 
country’s relations with the US. While those with the 
EU  look  dismal,  those  with  East  Asia  uncertain  and 
demanding, those with the US seemed to be picking 
up  with  the  START  agreement  signed.  Yet  the 
European  missile  defence  scheme,  reportedly  to  be 
commanded from the well-known Rammstein base in 
Germany, was already by the end of January 2011 the 
new  talking  point,  and  has  steadily  occupied  the 
Gazeta. Indeed, more articles have been published on 
it from that time to mid-2012 (when President Obama 
told a NATO conference in Chicago that the system 
was  half-ready)  than  on  the  eurozone  crisis  and  its 
implications for Russia. Yet while START was seen as a 
Russia-US  treaty,  the  missile  defence  scheme  (in 
Russian,  ЕвроПРО,  the  Система  противоракетной 
обороны  в  Европе)  was  foregrounded  as  an  issue 
between  Russia  and  Europe,  even  though  of  course 
both entangle NATO. As Vladimir Kuzmin opined in an 
article  on  the  31
st  January  2011,  with  START 
concluded, Russian attention needed to “switch over” 
(переключается)  to  the  “problem  of  anti-missile 
defence,  as  yet  unresolved  between  Russia  and 
Europe”  (my  emphasis)  (Kuzmin,  “От  СНВ”  31
st 
January 2011).  Just after the signing of the START-3 
Treaty,  the  Gazeta  quoted  Deputy  Foreign  Minister 
Sergei Ryabkov and Deputy Defence Minister Anatoly 
Antonov as saying that the new treaty gave a “new 
start” to Russo-US relations. But the paper is quick to 
insert Ryabkov’s proviso that the pace must be kept 
up and the countries need to “move on” (двигаться 
дальше) as new problems may soon arise (Gavrilov, 
“Ракеты”, 8 February 2011).  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Detachment  and  concern,  in  combination  and 
alternation,  over  the  prospects  for  Europe 
characterize the Gazeta’s coverage of the euro crisis, 
and such ambivalence is in some ways comparable to 
that of the British press, especially in view of the two 
countries’  projection  of  their  (clearly  distinct) 
exceptionalism  in  relation  to  the  eurozone.  The 
Gazeta  shows  Russia  conscious  again  of  its 
multipolarity  (as  perhaps  before  in  the  “Primakov 
doctrine”  [Gulyaeva  2012]),  but  also  of  its  own 
specific  location  and  vantage-point  both 
geographically and historically, one which “the West” 
sometimes struggles to accommodate. As the report 
of  a  2009  Moscow  conference  opines,  “Europe  […] 
finds  it  hard  to  swallow  the  idea  of  an  exclusive 
relationship  between  Russia  and  the  US”  or  more 
generally  to  “deal  […]  with  a  real,  global  Russia” 
[Krastev  et  al.  76]).  Such  a  “glocal”  self-conception 
evinces an attitude again reminiscent of the writings 
of  Mackinder  but  also  of  and  Nikolai  S.  Trubetzkoy 
later  in  the  20
th  century.  As  mentioned  earlier, 
Mackinder  thought  Eurasian  space  the  “pivot”  or 
“heartland”  of  history;  Trubetzkoy  conceived  of the 
awakening consciousness of the peoples of this region 
to “one whole, organic unity” (к одному целому, к EUC Working Paper No. 8 
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органическому единству (Trubetzkoy, “Pan-Eurasian 
Nationalism”  [1927],  244).  Such  a  patterning  of 
contiguities  emanating  from  a  known  and  definite 
centre  might  concord  well  with  a  nuancing  of 
Primakov’s view of multipolarity as a mesh of bilateral 
relationships  or  contiguities  and  lesser  or  greater 
regionalisms (Primakov, Мир [2009], 168-169). Even if 
Russia has recently joined ASEM, its position in the 
institutional  architecture  (an  Asian  member,  a 
European one? Neither?) is anomalous. A June 2012 
All-Russian  Public  Opinion  Research  Centre 
(Всероссийский  центр  изучения  общественного 
мнения  [ВЦИОМ])  open  poll  found  that  55%  of 
Russians did not think that Russia could be compared 
to any other country (Germany was a distant second, 
at 12%, then the USA and Switzerland at 4% each; 7% 
were undecided) (All-Russian Public Opinion Research 
Centre,  “Что  ждёт  Россию  в  2020  году?”  [“What 
awaits Russia in 2020?”]).  
 
With  so  much  still  uncertain,  then,  it  is  indeed 
tempting  to  fall  back  on  established  patterns  of 
thought and pathways to partnerships and hence to 
transitory security. In his “Европа: хорошие новости” 
(“Europe: good news”) article (13 July 2012), Sergey 
Karaganov  distinguished  himself  from the  prevailing 
“apocalyptic  moods”  among  expert  opinion  with 
regard to the future course of the euro and the EU in 
general and separated abiding European values from 
the series of calamities through which the Union was 
currently going. There is something rather appealing 
but on the other hand also rather demeaning in the 
view that an almost superannuated Europe should still 
see  itself  as  a  “larger-sized  Venice”,  the  city  state 
through which because of its trade routes to the East 
and  especially  the  Islamic  world  the  Renaissance 
made landfall in Europe, and in a sense the Germany 
of its day, but now most of all a tourist destination: 
“Let Europe where it can continue to produce the best 
products,  technologies  and  brands.  And  may  it 
become a great museum, a sanatorium for the soul 
and the body for hundreds of millions of people from 
other  regions  of  the  world,  including  for  Russians.” 
The accent, it appears, should settle on the second 
objective,  Europe’s  ability  to  furnish  the  former 
(“where it can”, где сможет) being seemingly more 
limited and circumscribed. When trade in goods and 
even  services  no  longer  seems  so  self-evident  as  a 
motor of integration and expansion, falling back on 
cultural  goods  and  a traditional, even  the “eternal” 
Europe seems second-best but does offer for some a 
consolation. In such a view, and to paraphrase Sylvia 
Plath, cultivating a detachment where possible may 
help patch together an (albeit limited) contentment of 
sorts. 
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